TY  - BOOK
AU  -  Enevoldsen, Nils
AU  -  Pande, Rohini
AU  -  Walton, Michael
AU  - 2024
AU  - Banerjee, Abhijit
TI  - Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
SN  - 1945-7782
PB  - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
KW  -  Belief
KW  -  Housing
KW  -  Human Development
KW  -  Income Distribution
KW  -  Welfare
KW  - Education
N2  - Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed
UR  - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088
ER  -