Fudenberg, Drew <br/><br/>
Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes 

 -  American Economic Review: Insights  2024 
 - 509-525 
<br/><br/> We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner's dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ind 
<br/><br/><label>ISSN: </label>2640-205X 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/> Bargaining Theory<br/> Economic Anthropology<br/> Evolutionary Games<br/> Noncooperative Games<br/> Social and Economic Stratification<br/>Economic Sociology