TY  - BOOK
AU  - Fudenberg, Drew
AU  -  Wolitzky, Alexander
TI  - Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes
SN  - 2640-205X
PB  - American Economic Review: Insights
KW  -  Bargaining Theory
KW  -  Economic Anthropology
KW  -  Evolutionary Games
KW  -  Noncooperative Games
KW  -  Social and Economic Stratification
KW  - Economic Sociology
N2  - We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner's dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ind
UR  - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20230617
ER  -