Image from Google Jackets

Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints

By: Contributor(s): Material type: Continuing resourceContinuing resourcePublication details: Journal of Political Economy; 2024Description: 3708-3736ISSN:
  • 0022-3808
Subject(s): Online resources: Summary: We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stoch
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Item type Current library Vol info Status Barcode
Article Index Article Index Dr VKRV Rao Library Vol. 132, No. 11 Not for loan AI1443

We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stoch

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.
Share