000			01614nas a2200229Ia 4500
008			240628c99999999xx |||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1945-7731
100			_a Mommaerts, Corina _9119208
100			_aHong, Long _9119209
245		0	_aTime Aggregation in Health Insurance Deductibles
260			_bAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
260			_c2024
300			_a270-299
520			_aHealth insurance plans increasingly pay for expenses only beyond a large annual deductible. This paper explores the implications of deductibles that reset over shorter timespans. We develop a model of insurance demand between two actuarially equivalent deductible policies in which one deductible is larger and resets annually and the other deductible is smaller and resets biannually. Our model incorporates borrowing constraints, moral hazard, midyear contract switching, and delayable care. Calibrations using claims data show that the liquidity benefits of resetting deductibles can generate welfare gains of 3–10 percent of premium costs, particularly for individuals with borrowing constraints.
650			_a Insurance Companies
650			_a Intertemporal Household Choice _9119210
650			_a Life Cycle Models and Saving, Asymmetric and Private Information _9119211
650			_a Mechanism Design, Insurance _9119212
650			_aActuarial Studies, Household Finance: Household Saving, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth, Household Finance: Insurance, Health Insurance, Public and Private _9119213
650			_aHealth
856			_uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20210799
999			_c133392 _d133392