000			01697nas a2200205Ia 4500
008			240802c99999999xx |||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1078-0874
100			_aMughan, Sian _9119685
245		0	_aCan Local Government Mergers Reduce Costs When Capital Expenditures Are Low? Evidence from Court Mergers
260			_bUrban Affairs Review
260			_c2024
300			_a892-922
520			_aLocal government mergers, motivated by promises of cost savings via economies of scale (EoS) and reduced duplication of function, often fail to produce the anticipated savings. An inability or unwillingness to reduce personnel costs is often offered as a reason for this outcome. We explore this explanation by estimating the expenditure effects of court mergers in California. Our main result is that current judicial spending (total expenditures minus capital expenditures) increases significantly following consolidation. This is partially explained by a sustained increase in salaries paid to full-time workers. The number of workers increases in the years immediately following merger however over the long-term merger has no effect on employment levels, suggesting that mergers change the composition of the workforce. These findings have implications for all local governments that provide labor-intensive services, if mergers are to reduce expenditures officials must be willing to make difficult personnel decisions.
650			_a Expenditures _918784
650			_a Municipal Courts _9119686
650			_a Synthetic Control _9119687
650			_aLocal Government Consolidation _9119688
700			_a Overstreet, Dallin _9119689
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/10780874231209908
999			_c133530 _d133530