000			01488nas a2200229Ia 4500
008			240802c99999999xx |||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a0022-3808
100			_aBuchak, Greg _9120189
245		0	_aBeyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy
260			_bJournal of Political Economy
260			_c2024
300			_a616-693
520			_aWe empirically document two adjustment margins that are usually absent from the predominant “bank balance sheet lending” view of financial intermediation. For the shadow bank substitution margin, shadow banks substitute for traditional banks among loans that are easily sold. For the balance sheet retention margin, banks switch between balance sheet lending and selling loans based on their balance sheet strength. Estimates from a structural model show that these margins significantly shape policy responses, dampening the effect of capital requirements on lending whose costs are borne by wealthier borrowers. Secondary-market disruptions such as quantitative easing have significantly larger impacts on lending than capital requirements.
650			_a Bank Balance Sheet Lending _9120190
650			_a Bank Regulation _999728
650			_a Banking _9689
650			_aMonetary Policy
700			_a Matvos, Gregor _9120191
700			_a Piskorski, Tomasz _9120192
700			_a Seru, Amit _9120193
856			_uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/726703
999			_c133658 _d133658