000			01524nam a2200265Ia 4500
008			240826s9999||||xx |||||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1945-7782
100			_a Enevoldsen, Nils _9120617
100			_a Pande, Rohini _9120618
100			_a Walton, Michael _9120619
100			_a2024
100			_aBanerjee, Abhijit _9120620
245		0	_aPublic Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
260			_bAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
260			_c2024
300			_a323-353
520			_aTwo years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.
650			_a Belief
650			_a Housing _9284
650			_a Human Development
650			_a Income Distribution
650			_a Welfare _917615
650			_aEducation
856			_uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088
999			_c133746 _d133746