000			01448nam a2200229Ia 4500
008			241008s9999||||xx |||||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1945-7731
100			_aLotti, Clarissa _9121898
245		0	_aIndirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization
260			_bAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
260			_c2024
300			_a347-366
520			_aCentralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government's direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22 percent among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones.
650			_a Information and Knowledge _9119248
650			_a Learning
650			_a Public Sector Accounting and Audits _9121899
650			_aPublic Administration
700			_a Muco, Arieda _9121900
700			_a Spagnolo, Giancarlo _9121901
700			_a Valletti, Tommaso _9121902
856			_uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20220357
999			_c134167 _d134167