000			01647nam a2200205Ia 4500
008			241008s9999||||xx |||||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1573-1502
100			_aQuezada, Felipe J. _9122272
245		0	_aExternal Monitoring and Enforcement and the Success of Collective Property Rights Regimes
260			_bEnvironmental and Resource Economics
260			_c2024
300			_a605-628
520			_aIn this paper, we analyze how public monitoring and enforcement (M&E) efforts affect the success of a collective property right. We develop a bioeconomic model to generate several theoretical predictions, which we test empirically by assembling and analyzing novel data on public patrolling and fishing activity in the Chilean abalone fishery. Consistent with our model, we find robust evidence that patrolling increases abalone stocks and harvest for nearby fishers' organizations. In our preferred (conservative) specifications, a 10% increase in patrolling increases stock density by 0.95% and harvest by 1.2%, which translates roughly to an increase in annual revenues of 6770 USD on average within a port captainship jurisdiction. Our work provides new empirical evidence on the determinants of success for collective property rights regimes, revealing the pivotal role that public M&E can play in helping sustain these institutions.
650			_a Common Pool Resources _9122273
650			_a Monitoring and Enforcement _9122274
650			_a Territorial Use Rights for Fishing _9122275
650			_aCollective Property Right _9122276
700			_a Chan, Nathan W. _9122277
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-023-00828-9
999			_c134247 _d134247