000 | 01298nam a2200217Ia 4500 | ||
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008 | 241008s9999||||xx |||||||||||||| ||und|| | ||
022 | _a1573-1502 | ||
100 |
_aAntoniou, Fabio _9122364 |
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245 | 0 | _aRegulatory Stringency and Emission Leakage Mitigation | |
260 | _bEnvironmental and Resource Economics | ||
260 | _c2024 | ||
300 | _a1407-1424 | ||
520 | _aWe construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country's welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption. | ||
650 |
_a Cross-Border Pollution _9122365 |
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650 |
_a Emission Leakage _9122366 |
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650 | _a International Trade | ||
650 | _aEnvironmental Regulation | ||
700 |
_a Hatzipanayotou, Panos _9122367 |
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700 |
_a Tsakiris, Nikos _9122368 |
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856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-023-00837-8 | ||
999 |
_c134264 _d134264 |