000 01298nam a2200217Ia 4500
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022 _a1573-1502
100 _aAntoniou, Fabio
_9122364
245 0 _aRegulatory Stringency and Emission Leakage Mitigation
260 _bEnvironmental and Resource Economics
260 _c2024
300 _a1407-1424
520 _aWe construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country's welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption.
650 _a Cross-Border Pollution
_9122365
650 _a Emission Leakage
_9122366
650 _a International Trade
650 _aEnvironmental Regulation
700 _a Hatzipanayotou, Panos
_9122367
700 _a Tsakiris, Nikos
_9122368
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-023-00837-8
999 _c134264
_d134264