000			01298nam a2200217Ia 4500
008			241008s9999||||xx |||||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1573-1502
100			_aAntoniou, Fabio _9122364
245		0	_aRegulatory Stringency and Emission Leakage Mitigation
260			_bEnvironmental and Resource Economics
260			_c2024
300			_a1407-1424
520			_aWe construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country's welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption.
650			_a Cross-Border Pollution _9122365
650			_a Emission Leakage _9122366
650			_a International Trade
650			_aEnvironmental Regulation
700			_a Hatzipanayotou, Panos _9122367
700			_a Tsakiris, Nikos _9122368
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-023-00837-8
999			_c134264 _d134264