000 01364nas a2200205Ia 4500
008 241107c99999999xx |||||||||||| ||und||
022 _a0022-3808
100 _aNoack, Frederik
_9121973
245 0 _aCredit Markets, Property Rights, and the Commons
260 _bJournal of Political Economy
260 _c2024
300 _a2396-2450
520 _aCredit markets and property rights are fundamental for modern economies, but their implications for the commons are unknown. Using a dynamic model of competitive resource extraction, we show that improving property right security unambiguously increases conservation incentives, but the effect of credit markets on resource extraction effort hinges on the security of property rights. We test these predictions using data on global fisheries, credit markets, and the largest ever marine property rights assignment. We find that property right security reduces resource extraction and that credit market development increases resource extraction under insecure property rights but reduces resource extraction under secure property rights.
650 _a Credit Markets
_977782
650 _a Marine Property Rights
_9123234
650 _a Modern Economies
_9123235
650 _aProperty Rights
700 _a Costello, Christopher
_9123236
856 _uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/729065
999 _c134466
_d134466