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Repeated Trading: Transparency and Market Structure

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: American Economic Review; 2024Description: 2388-2435ISSN:
  • 0002-8282
Subject(s): Online resources: Summary: We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency allows buyers to observe previously sold quantities. In markets with intraperiod monopsony (single buyer each period), transparency reduces welfare if the ex ante expected quality is low but improves welfare if the expected quality is high. The effect is reversed in markets with intraperiod competition (multiple buyers each period). This discrepancy in the efficiency implications of transparency is explained by how buyer competition affects the seller's ability to capture rents, which, in turn, influences market screening.
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Article Index Article Index Dr VKRV Rao Library Vol. 114, No. 8 Not for loan AI465

We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency allows buyers to observe previously sold quantities. In markets with intraperiod monopsony (single buyer each period), transparency reduces welfare if the ex ante expected quality is low but improves welfare if the expected quality is high. The effect is reversed in markets with intraperiod competition (multiple buyers each period). This discrepancy in the efficiency implications of transparency is explained by how buyer competition affects the seller's ability to capture rents, which, in turn, influences market screening.

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