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Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: American Economic Review: Insights; 2024Description: 509-525ISSN:
  • 2640-205X
Subject(s): Online resources: Summary: We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner's dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ind
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Article Index Article Index Dr VKRV Rao Library Vol. 6, No. 4 Not for loan AI1255

We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner's dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ind

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